Older adults process emotional speech differently than young adults, relying less on prosody (tone) relative to semantics (words). This study aimed to elucidate the mechanisms underlying these age-related differences via an emotional speech-in-noise test. A sample of 51 young and 47 older adults rated spoken sentences with emotional content on both prosody and semantics, presented on the background of wideband speech-spectrum noise (sensory interference) or on the background of multi-talker babble (sensory/cognitive interference). The presence of wideband noise eliminated age-related differences (...) in semantics but not in prosody when processing emotional speech. Conversely, the presence of babble resulted in the elimination of age-related differences across all measures. The results suggest that both sensory and cognitive-linguistic factors contribute to age-related changes in emotional speech processing. Because real world conditions typically involve noisy background, our results highlight the importance of testing under such conditions. (shrink)

Fichte claims in Section 5 of the Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre that the absolute I contains a difference between two directions. In this paper, I argue that this specific claim complements, rather than contradicts, his general position in Section 1, according to which the absolute I is a simple identity or a point. I first show that we can identify a version of what I call Fichte’s Two-Directions Theory in texts written both before and after the GWL. I term this (...) version his Two-Series Theory. Drawing on this reading, I demonstrate, in contrast to previous research, that Fichte consistently formulates the absolute I in a twofold manner: as a pure act that precedes any difference and as a proposition that contains a relation. I further argue that Fichte’s treatment of the absolute I as a simple unity and as a unity of two directions maps onto two stages within his philosophical investigation. On my account, Fichte seeks to comprehend the absolute I by considering the I’s activity both as it is in itself and as it presents itself to thought. (shrink)

William Alston has identified what he calls a “Christian Mystical Practice” as one of the many doxastic practices in which humans engage. He defends CMP as being as rational as other doxastic practices, including the sense perceptual practice, having its own input and output rules, and its own background overrider system. I argue that there seems to be a serious problem with Alston’s characterization of the overrider system for CMP. The presence of this problem threatens to damage Alston’s argument for (...) the rationality of engaging in the Christian Mystical Practice. (shrink)

This paper examines the claim that the two final articles of Rav Kook’s book Ikvei Hatzon were written as a response to a lecture given by Hermann Cohen. It first reviews Cohen’s lecture showing that, regarding the concept of God, Cohen argues for the compatibility of Judaism and Kantianism in denying the dogmatic-mythological preoccupation with the existence of God in favor of understanding God as the basis of morality. Second, it analyzes Kook’s articles, demonstrating that he accepts the compatibility of (...) Judaism and Kantianism together with the denial of the dogmatic relation to God as a substance. Nevertheless, Kook is not satisfied with the critical view that denies the dogmatic relation to the substance altogether, since it formulates a merely negative relationship with God. Instead, he develops his concept of the Divine Ideals, which synthesizes the dogmatic preoccupation with substantiality and the critical denial of it. The Divine Ideals are the moral progression of man, through which man gradually becomes identical to God. Within the Divine Ideals, dogmatism becomes an emotional striving to be identical with God as a substance, while criticism is the intellectual negation of the possibility of such identity, which ensures that the process will continue indefinitely. (shrink)

I would like to argue that to a large extent universities are themselves to blame for their failure to respond adequately to external pressures of the day. Barring the work of a few exceptional departments and individuals here and there, universities are incapable of addressing precisely those problems that most preoccupy our societies nowadays. Granted, universities rightly regard themselves as playing a key role in preserving intellectual, academic and cultural traditions. This, however, should not be taken to be an acceptable (...) excuse for not dealing with fundamental social injustices and discrepancies - problems often deemed to lie outside the scope of a university's legitimate interests. Since universities are by far the most important institutions in any modern society entrusted with the task of creating knowledge, they should also strive to apply the knowledge created there to major social issues at any given time. This paper substantiates this thesis through some examples, and discusses its bearing on the future of the university curriculum. (shrink)

Translators of Aristotle’s and Averroës’ metaphysical works into 14th C Hebrew often associated important philosophical concepts with Hebrew terms that were also used to signify central Jewish and Biblical religious concepts. Here I examine how two such terms, “mofet” and “devequt”, were used to refer to extraordinary, divine wonders and to clinging (in particular to God) respectively in the religious texts, but to Aristotelian demonstration and continuity (especially noetic continuity) respectively in the translations of Averroës’ Long Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics. (...) This kind of convergence of metaphysical and religious terms makes possible, indeed encourages, a re-interpretation of the religious concepts along Aristotelian lines. Biblical expressions of God’s wonders are thus to be interpreted to refer to Aristotelian demonstration and the mystical desire to cling to God is to refer to unifi cation with the Active Intellect.Translatores, qui Aristotelis et Averrois opera metaphysica in linguam Hebraicam saeculi 14. transferebant, notabilibus conceptibus philosophicis saepe nomina Hebraica assignaverut, quibus et principales notiones religiosae Judaicae ac Biblicae solebant exprimi. In hac dissertatione investigatur, quomodo duo talium nominum, scil. “mofet” et “devequt”, quae in textibus religiosis “extra ordinaria miracula divina” et “adhaerentiam” (praecipue ad Deum) proprie significant, in translationibus Averrois Commentarii Magni in Aristotelis Metaphysicam ad demonstrationem Aristotelicam et continuationem (praecipue noeticam) significandas transumebantur. Huiusmodi nominum metaphysicorum cum religiosis coniunctio conceptus religiosos iuxta sensum Aristotelicum denuo explicari permittit, imo suadet. Hinc dicta Biblica quae miracula Dei olim significaverunt ad demonstrationes Aristotelicas relata sunt; item desiderium mysticum adhaerendi ad Deum de unione cum Intellectu Agenti intellectum est. (shrink)

Welcoming their scholarly focus on metaphorizing, I critique Díaz-Rojas, Soto-Andrade and Videla-Reyes’s selection of the hypothetical constructs “conceptual metaphor” and “enactive ….

Theories of music evolution rely on our understanding of what music is. Here, I argue that music is best conceptualized as an interactive technology, and propose a coevolutionary framework for its emergence. I present two basic models of attachment formation through behavioral alignment applicable to all forms of affiliative interaction and argue that the most critical distinguishing feature of music is entrained temporal coordination. Music's unique interactive strategy invites active participation and allows interactions to last longer, include more participants, and (...) unify emotional states more effectively. Regarding its evolution, I propose that music, like language, evolved in a process of collective invention followed by genetic accommodation. I provide an outline of the initial evolutionary process which led to the emergence of music, centered on four key features: technology, shared intentionality, extended kinship, and multilevel society. Implications of this framework on music evolution, psychology, cross-species and cross-cultural research are discussed. (shrink)

In his published lectures Civilizations: Nostalgia and Utopia, Daya Krishna criticizes postmodern thought and especially the writings of Jacques Derrida. By outlining similarities between the two, I would claim that, indeed, it was Daya Krishna’s unexpected proximity to Derrida’s ‘deconstruction’ project that triggered his scathing critique of the latter. Moreover, Daya Krishna’s response to Derrida reveals an ongoing inner conflict in his own thinking. On the one hand, he provides us with a harsh critique of Derrida the ‘postmodern’; on the (...) other hand, he concedes that the ‘modern’ notion of knowledge has been totally transformed, and the ‘deconstruction’ of its old formulations was the major catalyst that provoked and directed his own philosophical enterprise in the last years of his life, reformulating knowledges. Reconstructing in this way, the dialogue which never happened might prove beneficial, not only for understanding the distinctive works of its participants, but also for carrying their writings and us one step further towards a productive, ‘relevant’ philosophical discourse in the twenty-first century. (shrink)

‘In the beginning was the word And the word was aardvark’Oulipo, Aux origines du langage, Bibliothéque oulipienne no. 121First I think I should explain that call. It echoed in my ears for the first time a very long time ago and far, far away: on the Roof of the World, the Afghan Pamir, more than 30 years ago. It was uttered by a Kirghiz shepherd following a herd of sheep. Even if it is not in fact possible to transcribe that (...) call accurately - the combination of the phonetic parameters that determine it would necessitate a representation using a graph or numerical matrices - I will attempt to give it a written shape, HAY, while admitting that this transcription denotes an abstraction that subsumes many possible realizations. But be that as it may. A few years later, when I was living in the Haut-Livradois, in the deepest heart of rural France, I was surprised to hear that call again on the lips of an Auvergnat peasant who was taking his sheep to the meadow. This unlikely coincidence led me to take a closer interest in the problem of communication between humans and animals. It is the essence of that thinking that I would today like to pass on to the readers of Diogenes in an issue devoted to the East/West contrast. (shrink)

The ArgumentErnst Cassirer's theory of language as a symbolic form, one of the richest and most insightful philosophies of language of the twentieth century, went virtually unnoticed in the mainstreams of modern linguistics. This was so for what seems to be a good metatheoretical reason: Cassirer insisted on the constitutive role of meaning in the explanation of linguistic phenomena, a position which was explicitly rejected by both American Structuralists and Chomskian Generativists. In the last decade, however, a new and promising (...) linguistic framework has emerged — the framework of lexical semantics — which seems to bear close theoretical resemblance to Cassirer's theory. In this paper, I show how the empirical results accumulated within the framework of lexical semantics serve to validate Cassirer's most fundamental philosophical insights, and suggest that Cassirer's philosophy helps position these empirical results in their appropriate epistemological context. I discuss the following fundamental points, which, for me, constitute the backbone of both Cassirer's philosophy and the theory of lexical semantics: natural language grammars constitute structural reflections of a deeply-rooted, highly structured level of semantic organization; the representational level of linguistic meaning, which is prior to experience in the Kantian sense, comprises a partial set of semantic notions, which language selects as centers of perceptual attention; this partial set is potentially different from the sets selected by other symbolic forms, such as myth, science, and art; and linguistic variability is to be explained in universalistic terms, thus allowing for specific patterns of variability within universally-constrained limits. (shrink)

The thesis concerns itself with the selection constraints governing the basic distributional patterns of five complement constructions in English--the bare clause, the that-clause, the interrogative, the concealed question construction and the exclamative complement--across a wide array of knowledge, belief and communication predicates. The relevant distributional phenomena--which predicates are capable of embedding which complement types--have traditionally been captured by stipulative grammatical markings such as subcategorization frames, semantic selection frames and case-theoretic lexical markings. These theoretical tools, even to the extent that they (...) successfully reduplicate the observed phenomena, are of no explanatory value, as they do not derive the different behavioral patterns from some independently established properties of the embedding predicates or their complements. In the thesis, I present an epistemically-based theory, which attempts to derive the relevant distributional phenomena, including those traditionally assumed to reflect hard-core syntactic idiosyncrasies, from a linguistic-epistemic theory of knowledge, belief and communication. ;The theory is based on a lexical-semantic analysis of the embedding predicates, according to which they denote ternary relations between agents, objects of attitude and objects of representation. Thus, to give an example, the predicate think denotes a ternary relation between a thinker, a thought mentally represented by the thinker, and a proposition expressed by the thought and believed by the thinker to be true. This analysis, developed on linguistic grounds for linguistic purposes, echoes some of the recent insights in the philosophy of mind, especially Crimmins . Coupled with a theory of the meanings of the different complement types--partially based on the formal semantic insights of Karttunen , Groenedijk and Stokhof and Ginzburg --this account derives the distributional patterns from simple considerations of semantic compatibility: those predicates which are capable of embedding a certain complement type are exactly those whose lexical semantics is compatible with the semantics of the complement. ;Some of the distributional patterns discussed in the thesis, especially the one involving concealed questions, have traditionally been taken to provide empirical support for the hypothesis of the autonomy of syntactic representations . The analysis presented in this thesis reveals the dramatic extent to which the semantics and the syntax of lexical selection are transparent to each other, and thus implies, at least with respect to the core domain of lexical selection, that the autonomy hypothesis is empirically unjustified. (shrink)

This study examines the influence of three components of corporate social responsibility on team performance. In the proposed model of this study, team performance is indirectly affected by three dimensions of perceived corporate citizenship (i.e., economic, legal, and ethical citizenship) via the mediation of team efficacy and team self-esteem. Surveying members of 172 teams confirms most of our hypothesized effects. Our results show that economic citizenship influences team performance via the mediation of both team efficacy and team self-esteem. However, legal (...) citizenship influences team performance via team efficacy alone, whereas ethical citizenship influences team performance only via team self-esteem. We discuss the theoretical and managerial implications of our findings. (shrink)

In this critical review I outline the three main themes of Gellman’s The People, The Torah, The God, and explore the extent to which it lives up to its subtitle, as a “neo-traditional Jewish Theology.” The book is a summary of three volumes of Gellman’s previous work. The summary and the trilogy make an important contribution to contemporary Jewish thought. On some matters, I argue, Gellman’s thinking is more traditional than he realises. But irrespective of whether his theories live up (...) to his own subtitle, they are eminently worthy of our attention. (shrink)

Pt. 1. The individual and his creator. The fear of God in our time -- Natural morality -- In-depth Torah study -- Levels of mitzvot -- The personal element in serving God -- Religious experience -- Naturalness in the worship of God -- The significance of Torah values -- Tension vs. tranquility in the worship of God -- Pt. 2. The individual and society. Fundamentals of prayer -- Derekh eretz, being a mensch -- "I dwell among my people" -- The (...) obligation to sanctify God's name -- Attending to the needs of the community -- The message beyond mere words -- How to relate to one who has lost his faith -- Pt. 3. The individual and his life. Humanity -- Dealing with crisis -- Adhering to values -- Independent decision-making. (shrink)

In this paper I mainly draw attention to the largely discussed § 244 of the Philosophical Investigations of Ludwig Wittgenstein. I begin by providing what I take to be a right reconstruction of the argument in it, in which Wittgenstein maintains that, in contradistinction to the presup-positions of the supporter of a private language, we learn words for sen-sations, like “pain”, for example, not by correlating the sign directly with the corresponding sensation. Instead, “pain” is learned in connection with the (...) natural expression of pain, with pain-behavior, so that the word takes the place of the natural expression. Next, I develop two lines of criticism on Wittgenstein’s argument. First, I argue that Wittgenstein does not explain how the learner substitutes the conventional expression for the natural one. Second, I maintain that, in his explanation of how we learn words for sensations, Wittgenstein shares one of the most impor-tant presuppositions of the private language, the very one that he wanted to discard once and for all, namely, that one can know from her own case what pain is. (shrink)

Die Frage nach dem Verhältnis von Moral und Philosphie der Moral stellt sich für den Verfasser als Frage nach dor Notwendigkeit einer philosophischen Ethik sowohl grundsätzlich wie insbesondere heute. In dem Beitrag wird gezeigt, daß in zweierlei Hinsicht mit Recht und triftigen Gründen von der Notwendigkeit einer philosophischen Ethik gesprochen werden kann: 1) in Hinblick auf das systematische Verhältn is von Moral und philosophischer Ethik und 2) im Hinblick auf das geschichtliche Verhältnis beider, das durch die Strukturunserer gegenwärtigen Lebenswelt begründet (...) ist. Die grundlegende den Rahmen für die anderen vorgebende These des Aufsatzes lautet: Philosophische Ethik ist aufgrund der allgemeinen Züge, Bedingungen und Folgeerscheinungen demokratisch verfaßter hochkomplexer Industriegesellschaften struktur-funktional notwendig, da Gesellschaften dieses Typs eine notwendigerweise amorphe Öffentlichkeit ausbilden und wegen des Verlustes allgemein verbindlicher Weltbilder sowie durch die zwangsläufige Partikulariesierung der Lebensverhältnisse, die eine Privatiserung der Religionen im Gefolge hat, eine Lebensbedrohende Dialektik von Pluralismus der Moralen und abstrakter Einheitsmoral erzeugen. (shrink)

Os pressupostos da estrutura afetiva dos tipos de governo em Hobbes dizem respeito aos afetos fundamentais que determinam as ações humanas desde o estado de natureza, em especial o medo, o egoísmo e a glória. O medo, para Hobbes, talvez seja o afeto mais restritivo da liberdade natural no estado de natureza e, ao contrário, a principal condição para a obtenção da paz no estado civil, mas a esperança de glória é tão relevante quanto o medo para a transformação do (...) homem natural num ser social e, posteriormente, num súdito e num cidadão. (shrink)

One of the most significant factors that harms a society in the long term is the gradual distancing from its shared values ​​and potential to bring differences together. In this study, we will discuss the transformation of Hebrew from a sacred scriptural language into a language used in daily life, which was thought of years before the establishment of Israel in 1948. The journey began with Prophet Joseph and his eleven brothers arriving in Egypt, who, after Joseph's death, gradually became (...) a minority and the Israelites were enslaved in Egypt. Their journey, initiated by Prophet Moses’s saviorship, was thwarted because they refused to enter the land of Canaan by fighting, and from that day on, nomadism and statelessness became their main problems. Consequently, before 1948, Jews were seen trying many ways to survive in different countries around the world. For a while, Jews lived in their own neighborhoods but chose to assimilate in the lands they lived in under various guidance, under the influence of the enlightenment period known as Haskalah. This allowed them to occupy many previously forbidden professions, including ministries. However, the Dreyfus Affair that occurred in France and the pogroms that started under the Russian Tsardom disrupted the assimilation process, leading to the maturation of Zionist thought. Meanwhile, in a world where Jews used the language of the countries they lived in with different regulations, a young man named Ben-Yehuda alone began the process of making Hebrew a spoken language and the banker Rothschild family supported this young man financially until the end. Despite all obstacles and difficulties, Hebrew was declared the official language in Palestine in 1922 and was made compulsory in kindergartens. The purpose of this study is to give a concrete example of the dilemma of what can I do alone, of humanity, who was turned into witnesses to the genocide that took place, especially after October 7, and also the importance of investing in people and the belief that the right goal will eventually be achieved one day. Thus, Zionism, summarized as Jewish nationalism, used religious motives over the promised land as a value that could keep all Jews together, while solving the critical aspect of a common language which was its most important pillar, in the early 1900s, and only the land part remained. (shrink)

Building on Dor’s theory of language as a social technology for the instruction of imagination, I suggest that autobiographical memory evolved culturally as a response to the problems of false memory and deliberate deceit that were introduced by that technology. I propose that sapiens’ linguistic communication about past and future events initially occurred in small groups, and this helped to correct individual memory defects. However, when human groups grew in size and became more socially differentiated, and movement between groups prevented (...) story-verification, misattributions of events became more common. In such conditions individuals with better autobiographical memory had an advantage because they could evaluate their own contents and sources of information, as well as that of others, more accurately; this not only benefitted them directly, but also improved their reliability as social partners. Autobiographical memory thus evolved in the context of human linguistic communication through selection for communicative reliability. However, the advantages of imagination, which enables forward-planning and decision-Making, meant that memory distortions, although controlled and moderated by autobiographical memory, could not be totally eradicated. This may have driven the evolution of additional forms of memory control involving social and linguistic norms. I interpret the language and the social norms of the Pirahã as the outcome of the cultural-evolutionary control of memory distortions. Some ways of testing aspects of this proposal are outlined. (shrink)

The death of Imre Lakatos on February 2, 1974 was a personal and philosophical loss to the worldwide circle of his friends, colleagues and students. This volume reflects the range of his interests in mathematics, logic, politics and especially in the history and methodology of the sciences. Indeed, Lakatos was a man in search of rationality in all of its forms. He thought he had found it in the historical development of scientific knowledge, yet he also saw rationality endangered everywhere. (...) To honor Lakatos is to honor his sharp and aggressive criticism as well as his humane warmth and his quick wit. He was a person to love and to struggle with. PAUL K. FEYERABEND ROBERT S. COHEN MARX W. WARTOFSKY TABLE OF CONTENTS Preface VII JOHN WORRALL / Imre Lakatos : Philosopher of Mathematics and Philosopher of Science JOSEPH AGASSI / The Lakatosian Revolution 9 23 D. M. ARMSTRONG / Immediate Perception w. W. BAR TLEY, III/On Imre Lakatos 37 WILLIAM BERKSON / Lakatos One and Lakatos Two: An Appreciation 39 I. B. COHEN / William Whewell and the Concept of Scientific Revolution 55 L. JONATHAN COHEN / How Can One Testimony Corroborate Another? 65 R. S. COHEN / Constraints on Science 79 GENE D'AMOUR/ Research Programs, Rationality, and Ethics 87 YEHUDA ELKANA / Introduction: Culture, Cultural System and Science 99 PA UL K. (shrink)

Blindsight and vision for action seem to be exemplars of unconscious visual processes. However, researchers have recently argued that blindsight is not really a kind of uncon- scious vision but is rather severely degraded conscious vision. Morten Overgaard and col- leagues have recently developed new methods for measuring the visibility of visual stimuli. Studies using these methods show that reported clarity of visual stimuli correlates with accuracy in both normal individuals and blindsight patients. Vision for action has also come under (...) scrutiny. Recent findings seem to show that information processed by the dor- sal stream for online action contributes to visual awareness. Some interpret these results as showing that some dorsal stream processes are conscious visual processes (e.g., Gallese, 2007; Jacob & Jeannerod, 2003). The aim of this paper is to provide new support for the more traditional view that blindsight and vision for action are genuinely unconscious per- ceptual processes. I argue that individuals with blindsight do not have access to the kind of purely qualitative color and size information which normal individuals do. So, even though people with blindsight have a kind of cognitive consciousness, visual information process- ing in blindsight patients is not associated with a distinctly visual phenomenology. I argue further that while dorsal stream processing seems to contribute to visual awareness, only information processed by the early dorsal stream (V1, V2, and V3) is broadcast to working memory. Information processed by later parts of the dorsal stream (the parietal lobe) never reaches working memory and hence does not correlate with phenomenal awareness. I con- clude that both blindsight and vision for action are genuinely unconscious visual processes. (shrink)

Among those who know Yehuda's work, the term “two-tier thinking” is usually associated with a problematic relativist position. But “two-tier thinking” is not a name for a philosophical argument; it is best understood, I think, as a term designating certain conditions of knowledge: universal, or modern, or perhaps only postmodern conditions, but in any case, they are generalizations derived from anthropological and psychological observations on matters of facts. This is how things actually work in the sphere of knowledge: Western (...) intellectuals and scientists tend to acknowledge that their truth claims and certainly their normative claims are incompatible with other claims that stem from other belief systems, frameworks of thought or genres of discourses, and there is no final, impartial instance of judgment to adjudicate between the incompatible claims and the conflicting systems. Lack of “final,” impartial judgment does not hinder people from taking their truth claims seriously and acting as realists within the world constituted by their particular belief systems — tier 1. But when they come to reflect upon it, as some of them do, sometimes, they acknowledge the context-dependence of this realism and the fact that there is no way to make good on its claim to universality; theirs, they know, is but one particular “belief system,” or “genre of discourse,” among many. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to say something about the continuing impact of the Holocaust as an historical event through the application of aspects of Arendt's political thought and, at the same time, to say something about Arendt's distinctive understanding of the problems of post-Holocaust culture. An aim of this sort carries the intrinsic danger that the event in question becomes simply an illustration or grist to a particularinterpretative mill, an outcome that would be particularly undesirable here if it (...) afforded the Nazi Holocaust merely exemplary status. However, the danger may be easier to avoid in this case than in many due to a particular aspect of Arendt's thought itself. She places consistent emphasis upon the importance of the unprecedented event, the eventthat even with hindsight carries a sense of complete improbability and which changes the world and how we think about it. Arendt usually has in mind here ''positive'' political events such as acts of foundation but I want to suggest that implicitly her thought can also accommodate the notion of the Holocaust as an unprecedented ''negative''; an event that persists in its impact not because, like foundational acts, it establishes a self-reproducing arena of action and judgment, but because it insinuates a self-reproducing form of ruin. Arendt would have been sympathetic, I think, to Yehuda Bauer's description of the Holocaust as an ''upside-down miracle.''1 Undoubtedly, she regarded the Holocaust as having a symbolic significance, representing the apotheosis of the experience of modernity. The destruction of the personality in its juridical, moral and political forms enacted as a principle the superfluousness of mankind already present in the experience of modern mass society, where the vital distinction between freedom and necessity is obscured as social life fallsincreasingly under the rule of impersonal processes.2 This symbolic rendering aside, however, implicit in Arendt's thoughts on the political conditions of cognition, is an available sense of a continuing, more than symbolic significance attaching to the Holocaust as an unprecedented negative occurrence which changed things for good. Equally, and by the same token, bringing Arendt's thought to bear here will reveal an acute sense of the irreversible novelty of the contemporary, post-Holocaust situation and of the unprecedented cultural and political predicament it involves: the internal relation she posits between human plurality and cognitive certification illuminates the sense in which events involving the emasculation of plurality, and a consequent erosion of the basis of cognition, create problematic legacies for the historical imagination and in turn pose a continuing threat to freedom. I will suggest that Arendt's political thought is self-consciously located within, and structured by, this situation. It has been argued that the Holocaust represents an ''unmasterable'' episode; that it resists proper comprehension or analysis. There may be good reasons for thinking that in some sense this is true. Some critics of this view have taken it to imply that we cannot learn anything from the Holocaust as an historical event.3 In fact, I will argue, Arendt's approach delivers a sense in which this ''unmasterable'' event may carry a particular kind of significance and establishes a particular kind of point to attempts at Holocaust remembrance. At issue throughout will be the Arendtian conception of judgment. I shall suggest that what is at stake is the possibility of judgment and that this implicates the possibility of culture. I will begin by looking at some symptoms of what I take to be the problem of the Holocaust as an historical event, as an object for historical memory, and at how these may be generalised in a way which invites an Arendtian commentary. (shrink)

Among early modern Christian kabbbalists such as Pico della Mirandola and Christian Knorr von Rosenroth, Kabbalah counts as part of philosophia perennis and esoteric Jewish philosophy. Bruckers differentiation between Kabbalah as esoteric Jewish philosophy and Maimonides as exoteric Jewish philosophy is taken up by Tiedemann and Hegel, and is well known to Schelling and Molitor. In opposition to this taxinomy among Christian philosophers, Jewish philosophers and scholars of »Wissenschaft des Judentums« like Salomon Munk, Manuel Joel, Hermann Cohen or Julius Guttmann (...) exclude Kabbalah from the canon of Jewish philosophy proper, exemplified by Yehuda Halevi or Maimonides. It is only after World War I that Gershom Scholem inaugurates the modern research of Kabbalah as »mysticism«, juxtaposed to philosophy and to the rationalistic traditions inJudaism. (shrink)

ḥeleḳ 1. ha-Petiḥah : ha-Shem ha-meforash, En ʻod mi-levado, Torat emet ; Shaʻar 1. Matan Torah : ha-Torah she-ḳibel Mosheh mi-Sinai, ha-Shekhinah ṿeha-dibur be-Sinai uva-Ohel moʻed, seder ha-parashiyot shel matan Torah, Mosheh Rabenu ṿe-talmidaṿ ; Shaʻar 2. ha-Neviʼim : ha-Zeḳenim, ha-Shofṭim, ha-Neviʼim, Anshe keneset ha-gedolah -- ḥeleḳ 2. Shaʻar 3. ha-Tanaʼim : Bayit sheni, Yavneh, Bet Hilel u-Vet Shamai, R. ʻAḳiva ṿe-talmidaṿ, R. Yehudah ha-Naśi ; Shaʻar 4. ha-Amoraʼim : ha-dor ha-rishon shel ha-Amoraʼim, ha-dor ha-sheni ha-shelishi ṿeha-reviʻi shel ha-Amoraʼim ; (...) Shaʻar 5. ha-Rishonim, ha-Aḥaronim ṿeha-Geʼonim. (shrink)

Neste artigo, apresento uma solução possível para o clássico problema da aparente incompatibilidade entre o Princípio da Maior Felicidade de John Stuart Mill e seu Princípio da Liberdade, argumentando que na esfera "concernente aos outros" os julgamentos de experiência e o conhecimento acumulado através da história têm força moral e legal, enquanto na esfera "autoconcernente" os julgamentos dos experientes têm apenas valor prudencial, e a razão para isto é a ideia que cada um de nós é um juiz, melhor do (...) que qualquer outra pessoa, para decidir o que nos causa dor e que tipo de prazer preferimos (o assim chamado argumento epistemológico). Considerando que o Princípio da Maior Felicidade não é nada mais do que o agregado da felicidade de cada pessoa, levando em consideração o argumento epistemológico concluiríamos que, deixando as pessoas livres até mesmo para causar dano a elas mesmas, ainda estaríamos maximizando a felicidade, e então ambos os princípios (O Princípio da Maior Felicidade e o Princípio da Liberdade) poderiam ser compatíveis. In this article I present a possible solution for the classic problem of the apparent incompatibility between Mill's Greatest Happiness Principle and his Principle of Liberty arguing that in the other-regarding sphere the judgments of experience and knowledge accumulated through history have moral and legal force, whilst in the self-regarding sphere the judgments of the experienced people only have prudential value and the reason for this is the idea according to which each of us is a better judge than anyone else to decide what causes us pain and which kind of pleasure we prefer (the so-called epistemological argument). Considering that the Greatest Happiness Principle is nothing but the aggregate of each person's happiness, given the epistemological claim we conclude that, by leaving people free even to cause harm to themselves, we still would be maximizing happiness, so both principles (the Greatest Happiness Principle and the Principle of Liberty) could be compatible. (shrink)

The Disputation or Cathechesis of Tortosa with its sixty-nine sessions (February 7, 1413-November 12, 1413) was the longest of the Jewish Christian encounters in the Middle Age. Stirred by the Avignonesian Pope Benedict XIII, Geronimo de Sancta Fide, olim Yehoshua ha-Lorki, summoned a group of Catalan and Aragonese rabbis to inform them that the Messiah was already came. Not only the Papal notaries recorded the excruciating debates, but also two Hebrew sources: the anonymous and fragmentary letter published by Halberstam in (...) 1868 and the chapter 40 of the Shebet Yehuda. They encompass the first nine sessions carried out orally, before the Pope requested for written texts to be debated lately. Since these sources disagree on many details, this paper aims at examining them anew. That examination has shown that the anonymous account is more accurate than the fictional report of the Shebet Yehuda as far as the internal chronology of the sessions, the speeches of the Jewish delegates and their identities are concerned. The internal evidence leads us to subscribe with Riera i Sans in ascribing its authorship to Bonastruc Desmestre from Girona, who was at Tortosa on request of the Pope. He probably knew other Jewish chronicle and added some new materials from the Vikkuach Ramban, Salomon Ibn Verga, the author of Shebet Yehuda, built upon this chronicle and created a fictional account around Vidal Benveniste or the ‘ideal’ portrait of the Pope and added some materials from the Latin Protocols or from unknown Jewish sources. (shrink)

Resumo O meu objetivo neste artigo é examinar criticamente o argumento de Kripke contra a teoria da identidade tipo-tipo. Assumindo a tese da necessidade da identidade, bem como a tese da designação rígida, Kripke sustenta que se a dor é idêntica à estimulação das fibras C, então a dor é necessariamente idêntica à estimulação das fibras C. No entanto, precisamente porque a proposição expressa pela frase “a dor não é idêntica à estimulação das fibras C” é uma possibilidade metafísica, Kripke (...) conclui, por modus tollens, que não há identidade entre dor e estimulação das fibras C. Por isso, a teoria da identidade tipo-tipo não é uma solução bemsucedida para o problema da mente-corpo. Este artigo tem duas partes. Na primeira parte, que é expositiva, apresento o argumento de Kripke contra a teoria da identidade tipo-tipo. Subsequentemente, ponho em causa o argumento de Kripke, argumentando que não é procedente, pois a nossa situação epistémica atual não nos permite determinar se é metafisicamente possível a dor não ser idêntica à estimulação das fibras C. Assim, Kripke não refuta a teoria da identidade tipo-tipo. Palavras-chave : designação rígida, filosofia da mente, identidade tipo-tipo, Kripke, necessidade da identidadeMy aim in this paper is to critically assess Kripke’s argument against the type-type identity theory. Assuming the thesis of the necessity of identity, as well as the thesis of rigid designation, Kripke holds that if pain is identical with C-fibre firing, then pain is necessarily identical with C-fibre firing. However, precisely because the proposition expressed by the sentence “pain is not identical with C-fibre firing” is a metaphysical possibility, Kripke concludes, by modus tollens, that pain and C-fibre firing are not identical. Therefore, the type-type identity theory is not a successful solution to the mind-body problem. So this paper has two parts. In the first part, which is expositive, I present Kripke’s argument against the type-type identity theory. After that, I will dispute Kripke’s argument, arguing that it is not sound, for our current epistemic situation does not allow us to determine whether it is a metaphysical possibility that pain is not identical with C-fibre firing. Thus, Kripke does not refute the type-type identity theory. Keywords : Kripke, necessity of identity, philosophy of mind, rigid designation, type-type identity. (shrink)

20 November 1942 Writing the article, “Dor - A suadade romena” for Acção, I read again Eminescu’s “Mai am un singur dor”. Heretofore I believed that it has to do with his desire for reintegration in the Cosmos. Now I’m beginning to think it’s something else: the desire to find again, through death, his true cosmic family . Not reintegration - but the return home, to his own.

Israel’s conduct in the Occupied Territories in recent decades has been profoundly affected by three theologies: the messianic-kabalistic theology of Rabbi Abraham Yitzhak Ha-Cohen Kook and his son Rabbi Zvi Yehuda Ha-Cohen Kook; the messianic-Hasidic-kabalistic-racist theology of Rabbi Yitzhak Ginsburg; the violent, racist theology of Rabbi Meir Kahane. In the spirit of the three theologies, Israeli politics of the past four and a half decades has set the continuous possession of Judea and Samaria, and the deepening and expansion of (...) the settlement project therein, as the supreme goal of Zionism, Jewish nationalism. Moreover, the three theologies dictated much of the settlement policies of the government. Additionally, the three theologies have dictated much of the daily practices to which the Palestinian residents of the Territories have been subjected. All of this means that soldiers who are required to serve in the Occupied Territories, to die in them, and to kill Palestinians in the course of their military service therein, have been subjected to a politics motivated, to a substantial extent, by a religious culture premised on religious theologies. If such soldiers wish to refuse to abide by the orders given them to serve in the Occupied Territories, they can resort to the two traditional doctrines recgnized by liberal jurisprudence: the doctrine of civil disobedience and the doctrine of conscientous objection (Often there is an overlapp between the two defences). I argue that in addition to these two traditional doctrines, secular soldiers who are asked to serve in the Occupied Territories may resort to a doctrine I call “culture-based refusal.”. (shrink)

RESUMO Neste texto argumento que a filosofia moral de Hume tem uma base realista num sentido específico. Os sentimentos "peculiares" da moralidade, as formas morais de dor e prazer na contemplação das ações, sentimentos e caracteres dos outros, estão assentados sobre uma base pertencente à nossa sensibilidade que envolve o fato bruto da realidade da dor e do prazer. Argumento que a ênfase de Hume na "praticalidade" da moral não está a serviço prioritariamente de um projeto filosófico de explicação do (...) fenômeno moral, mas remete ao fundamento realista da moralidade em sentimentos humanos: "coisas" sentidas por seres humanos a respeito de outros seres humanos. Embora com implicações para a discussão tradicional sobre a ontologia moral de Hume, minha análise procura mostrar que o fundamento encontrado responde, de acordo com a orientação empirista em filosofia, a uma pergunta anterior sobre o que é real quando estão em jogo os interesses práticos de nossas vidas, por oposição aos teóricos. ABSTRACT I argue that Hume's moral philosophy is, basically, realist in that the "peculiar" sentiments constituting morality, the moral forms of pain and pleasure in the contemplation of actions, sentiments and characters are based on our sensibility as it reveals the brute realities of pain and pleasure. I argue that the place of pride Hume gives to the "practicality" of morals is not primarily in the service of the explanation of the moral phenomenon, it concerns rather the realist grounding of morality in the human sentiments: what we feel in regard to other human beings. In spite of the implications to the traditional discussion about Hume's morals ontology, my analysis aims to show that such a grounding answers, in tandem with the empiricist commitments of Hume's philosophy, the previous question about what is real when what concerns us are the practical interests of our lives, not merely the theoretical ones. (shrink)

In this work we study dimensional theoretical properties of some a±ne dynamical systems. By dimensional theoretical properties we mean Hausdor® dimension and box- counting dimension of invariant sets and ergodic measures on theses sets. Especially we are interested in two problems. First we ask whether the Hausdor® and box- counting dimension of invariant sets coincide. Second we ask whether there exists an ergodic measure of full Hausdor® dimension on these invariant sets. If this is not the case we ask the (...) question, whether at least the variational principle for Haus- dor® dimension holds, which means that there is a sequence of ergodic measures such that their Hausdor® dimension approximates the Hausdor® dimension of the invariant set. It seems to be well accepted by experts that these questions are of great importance in developing a dimension theory of dynamical systems (see the book of Pesin about dimension theory of dynamical systems [PE2]). Dimensional theoretical properties of conformal dynamical systems are fairly well understood today. For example there are general theorems about conformal repellers and hyperbolic sets for conformal di®eomorphisms (see chapter 7 of [PE2]). On the other hand the existence of two di®erent rates of expansion or contraction forces problems that are not captured by a general theory this days. At this stage of de- velopment of the dimension theory of dynamical systems it seems natural to study non conformal examples. This is the ¯rst step to understand the mechanisms that determine dimensional theoretical properties of non conformal dynamical systems. A±ne dynamical systems represent simple examples of non conformal systems. They are easy to de¯ne, but studying their dimensional theoretical properties does never- theless provide challenging mathematical problems and exemplify interesting phe- nomena. We consider here a special class of self-a±ne repellers in dimension two, depending on four parameters (see 2.1.). Furthermore we study a class of attractors of piecewise a±ne maps in dimension three depending on four parameters as well. The last object of our work are projections of these maps that are known as gener- alized Baker's transformations (see 2.2.). The contents of our work is the following: In chapter two we give an overview about some main results in the area of di- mension theory of a±ne dynamical systems and de¯ne the systems we study in this work. We will explain, what is known about the dimensional theoretical properties of these systems and describe what our new results are. In chapter three we then apply symbolic dynamics to our systems. We will introduce explicit shift codings 4 and ¯nd representations of all ergodic measures for our systems using these codings. From chapter four to chapter eight we study dimensional theoretical properties, which our systems generally or generically have. In chapter four we will prove a formula for the box-counting dimension of the repellers and the attractors (see the- orem 4.1.). Then in chapter ¯ve we apply general dimensional theoretical results for ergodic measures found by Ledrappier and Young [LY] and Barreira, Schmeling and Pesin [BPS] to our systems. These results relate the dimension of ergodic measures to metric entropy and Lyapunov exponents. Using this approach we will be able to reduce questions about the dimension of ergodic measures in our context to ques- tions about certain overlapping and especially overlapping self-similar measures on the line. These overlapping self-similar measures are studied in chapter six. Our main theorem extends a result of Peres and Solomyak [PS2] concerning the absolute continuity resp. singularity of symmetric self-similar measures to asymmetric ones (see theorem 6.1.3.). In chapter seven we bring our results together. We prove that we generically (in the sense of Lebesgue measure on a part of the parameter space) have the iden- tity of box-counting and Hausdor® dimension for the repellers and the attractors. (see theorem 7.1.1. and corollary 7.1.2.). This result suggest that one can expect that the identity of box-counting dimension and Hausdor® dimension holds at least generically in some natural classes of non conformal dynamical systems. Furthermore we will see in chapter seven that there generically exists an ergodic measure of full Hausdor® dimension for the repellers. On the other hand the vari- ational principle for Hausdor® dimension is not generic for the attractors. It holds only if we assume a certain symmetry (see theorem 7.1.1.). For generalized Baker's transformations we will ¯nd a part of the parameter space where there generically is an ergodic measure of full dimension and a part where the variational principle for Hausdor® dimension does not hold (see theorem 7.1.3.). Roughly speaking the reason why the variational principle does not hold here is, that if there exists both a stable and an unstable direction one can not generically maximize the dimension in the stable and in the unstable direction at the same time. In an other setting this phenomenon was observed before by Manning and McCluskey [MM]. In chapter eight we extend some results of the last section to invariant sets that correspond to special Markov chains instead of full shifts (see theorem 8.1.1.). In the last two chapters of our work we are interested in number theoretical excep- tions to our generic results. The starting point of our considerations in section nine are results of ErdÄos [ER1] and Alexander and Yorke [AY] that establish singularity and a decrease of dimension for in¯nite convolved Bernoulli measures under special conditions. Using a generalized notion of the Garsia entropy ([GA1/2]) we are able 5 to understand the consequences of number theoretical peculiarities in broader class of overlapping measures (see theorem 9.1.1.). In chapter ten we then analyze number theoretical peculiarities in the context of our dynamical systems. We restrict our attention to a symmetric situation where we generically have the existence of a Bernoulli measure of full dimension and the identity of Hausdor® and box-counting dimension for all of our systems. In the ¯rst section of chapter ten we ¯nd parameter values such that the variational principle for Hausdor® dimension does not hold for the attractors and for the Fat Baker's transformations (see theorem 10.1.1.). These are the ¯rst known examples of dynamical systems for which the variational principle for Hausdor® dimension does not hold because of number theoretical peculiarities of parameter values. For the repellers we have been able to show that under certain number theoretical conditions there is at least no Bernoulli measure of full Hausdor® dimension; the question if the variational principle for Hausdor® dimension holds remains open in this situation. In the second section of chapter ten we will show that the identity for Hausdor® and box-counting dimension can drops because there are number theoretical pecu- liarities. In the context of Weierstrass-like functions this phenomenon was observed by Przytycki and Urbanski [PU]. Our theorem extends this result to a larger class of sets, invariant under dynamical systems (see theorem 10.2.1). At the end of this work the reader will ¯nd two appendices, a list of notations and the list of references. In appendix A we introduce the notions of dimension we use in this work and collect some general facts in dimension theory. In appendix B we state the facts about Pisot-Vijayarghavan number, we need in our analysis of number theoretical peculiarities. The list of notations contains general notations and a table with a summary of notations we use to describe the dynamical systems that we study. Acknowledgments I wish to thank my supervisor JÄorg Schmeling for a lot of valuable discussion and all his help. Also thanks to Luis Barreira for his great hospitality in Lisboa and many interesting comments. This work was done while I was supported by "Promotionstipendium gem. NaFÄoG der Freien UniversitÄat Berlin". (shrink)

Study on conduct of life of Muslim women and women in Islamic perspective.